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RHETORIC AND REALITY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS 
Steven M. Davidoff* 
If America’s markets aren’t competitive, investors lose . . . .  If America’s 
markets are not transparent and open, investors lose. 
 
 —Christopher Cox, Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission1 
Rhetoric can drive reform.  Watch-words like “mutual recognition” 
and “global competition” have masked a political economy story 
which has driven the Security and Exchange Commission’s 
deregulation of foreign private issuers.  While the substantive result 
may have been appropriate, the overall SEC regulatory process did 
not produce a nuanced and holistic regulatory product.  Instead, the 
SEC promulgated one-size-fits-all regulation for foreign private 
issuers.  Despite the differing risk profiles and regulatory posture, 
Filipino or Chinese issuers listed only in the United States are now 
regulated in equal measure as a U.K. issuer listed on the London 
Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange.  This Article’s 
historical analysis highlights these issues as well as the difficulty of 
implementing more rigorous and insulating regulatory techniques 
such as cost–benefit analysis in light of the rhetoric and politics of 
regulation.  The relevance of this story is front and center as we face 
SEC regulatory action related to the financial crisis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mutual recognition, competitiveness, harmonization, and 
coordination.  These words are the rhetoric of international securities 
regulation.  They are akin to phrases like low-calorie, fortified, or 
doctor-recommended.  These phrases become social goods in and of 
themselves.  What could possibly be awry with such self-satisfying 
terms?  But there can be many wrongs.  Low calorie can simply be 
 *   Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.  This paper was prepared for, 
and presented at, the University of Cincinnati College of Law’s Globalization of Securities Regulation 
Symposium. 
 1. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Eases Regulations on Business, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at C6. 
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malnourishing.  Doctor recommended can be malpractice.  Fortified?  
Fortified with what? 
The rhetoric of such smooth sounding phrases can mask similar 
misdeeds in the regulatory arena.  Rhetoric can drive regulatory agendas 
in the name of social welfare but can also make for less than satisfying 
regulatory results.  More particularly, these words and their salience 
serve as carriers of regulatory change driven by political considerations.  
The fulsome rhetoric of social good forces through this change, but the 
political drivers result in less than holistic and nuanced regulatory 
products.  The administrative rule-making process—itself fraught with 
terms like cost–benefit analysis—can, instead, be subject to the same 
political vicissitudes as the legislative process.2 
This description fits the recent rule-making of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) with respect to the regulation of foreign 
private issuers.  Watch-words, like “mutual recognition” and “global 
competition,” masked a political economy and interest group story, 
which has resulted in private benefits to a core group of business 
constituencies.3  The results have been paraded as a net social good 
under the aegis of these phrases. 
This Article is more skeptical of the process.  The story of U.S. 
regulation of foreign listings in the new millennium is one of focused 
efforts by key interest groups, which have resulted in the steady 
deregulation of foreign private issuers in the name of “competitiveness.”  
But this has skewed the regulatory process, creating a one-size-fits-all 
regulation for foreign private issuers.  Filipino or Chinese issuers listed 
only in the United States are regulated at the same level as a U.K. issuer 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE).  In other words, regulation has been promulgated in 
heed of general principles but without attendance to details.4  As so 
 2. Cost–benefit analysis is an oft-advocated regulatory tool.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
COST–BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002).  It is not without its 
detractors and remains controversial.  See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON 
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2003); see also Matthew D. Adler 
and Eric A. Posner, Cost–Benefit Analysis: Legal Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 837 (2000). 
 3. This point is not new; many academics have written about the SEC and public choice theory 
on a more general basis.  See S.M. PHILLIPS & J.R. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 21–23 
(1981); James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625 (2007); 
John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit 
Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L. L. 531 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and 
Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994); see also 
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
 4. See Christopher Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1435 (2008); Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
89 (2007). 
2
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often happens with legislation, the rhetoric has driven the regulatory 
agenda.  The consequence is that regulation has been devalued beyond 
economic necessity, creating incentives for foreign issuers to list in the 
United States in order to extract regulatory advantages to the detriment 
of retail investors. 
This is not to say that regulators are being deceptive or otherwise 
improperly regulating, nor that all of this regulation is a net economic 
loss.  Rather, the mask of rhetoric has resulted in a march towards direct 
goals.  This is a classic political economy story.  The results have been 
in part good and in part bad, but they have resulted in wholesale, rather 
than nuanced, regulation tailored to the rhetoric surrounding this issue.  
The goal of regulation—to prevent negative externalities and ease 
economic frictions—has been lost due to expediency and political 
jockeying. 
This may be an inevitable part of the regulatory process, but the 
international securities regulatory product could be fine-tuned.  If this is 
too much, it may be better to recognize that the political process can 
infuse the regulatory process as much as the legislative one.  In the early 
days of the SEC, competition was equated with ensuring that domestic 
issuers were subject to regulation equivalent to but not more stringent 
than foreign private issuers.5  Today, in the name of globalization, 
competition has evolved into a movement to deregulate foreign private 
issuers without regard to domestic ones. 
This is true even of the SEC’s corporate finance division—a 
thoughtful body actively engaged with the securities bar and academia.  
Recognizing this development is helpful in proposing and enacting 
future securities regulation outside the international arena.  It is also 
useful for those who may be futilely advocating more rigorous and 
insulating regulatory techniques such as cost–benefit analysis.  This 
topic is again relevant due to the latest wave of regulatory action under 
the rhetoric of “investor protection” in the wake of the financial crisis. 
II. THE SEC AND THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS 
A. The Origins of Foreign Private Issuer Regulation 
Today’s foreign private issuer regulation stems from the SEC’s 19776 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. Other key dates were the 1964 Exchange Act amendments, which extended the registration 
requirements for foreign private issuers, and the SEC’s subsequent adoption of Rule 12g3-2 in 1967, 
which allowed for a safe-harbor if the issuer did not voluntarily seek out a stock exchange listing.  
Additionally, in 1976, the SEC released its first solicited comments on improving Form 20-F disclosure.  
See Means of Improving Disclosure by Certain Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 
3
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proposal to adopt Form 20-F and Exchange Act reporting rules 
mandating an integrated disclosure scheme for foreign private issuers 
substantially equivalent to domestic issuers.7  A year before this release, 
the SEC requested public comment on the issue of requiring more 
“meaningful” disclosure for foreign private issuers.  Of the fifty-four 
comment letters, forty-nine were critical of the proposal.8  The letters 
largely criticized the rules on the grounds that “increased disclosure 
burdens would deter use of the United States capital markets; 
consequently, international capital movements would be impaired.”9 
In response, the SEC stated that the comment letters did not “coincide 
with those of public investors,” as they “reflected the views of interested 
parties other than foreign issuers, stock exchanges and broker–dealers 
who would be most directly affected thereby.”10  The “protection of 
investors” militated towards this move: 
[t]hese proposed amendments . . . constitute, the Commission believes, a 
balanced approach toward rectifying that competitive imbalance and 
providing more timely and meaningful information to investors, thus 
promoting the maintenance of fair and honest markets.  The Commission 
further believes that improved information about foreign issuers may 
facilitate the free flow of capital among nations.11 
The “competitive balance” was not what we would assume would be 
the SEC’s principal concern.  Today it would ensure that the SEC 
calibrates regulation to attract and maintain foreign listings.  The 
competitive concern to the SEC in 1977, though, was the need to 
facilitate the “free flow of capital among nations,” as well as to reduce 
“any competitive disadvantages reporting domestic issuers possibly 
suffer in relation to reporting foreign issuers.”12  In other words, the 
SEC decided in 1977 that notions of competitiveness warranted raising 
disclosure requirements for foreign private issuers to a level similar to 
domestic issuers.  The competitive position the SEC wanted to preserve 
was that of U.S. domestic issuers vis-à-vis international competitors. 
The SEC desired to enhance domestic competitiveness, but this 
release also established a path dependency which would take hold.  
13,056, [1976–1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,830 (Dec. 10, 1976) [hereinafter 
1976 FPI Release]. 
 7. Foreign Private Issuers—Proposed Rules, Forms and Guidelines—Corresponding to 
Domestic Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 14,128, [1977–1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,361 (Nov. 2, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 FPI Release]. 
 8. Id. at 88,698.  See also 1976 FPI Release, supra note 6. 
 9. 1977 FPI Release, supra note 7, at 88,699. 
 10. Id. at 88,697–98. 
 11. Id. at 88,698–99. 
 12. Id. at 88,698. 
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There would be an integrated disclosure system for foreign private 
issuers, but that system would take into account the special needs of 
foreign private issuers.  Even though the release would create an 
integrated regime, it would still maintain the exemption for foreign 
private issuers from the Exchange Act’s quarterly and event-driven 
reporting requirements.13  The need to put domestic issuers on par with 
foreign private issuers would be implicitly balanced against the special 
requirements of foreign private issuers. 
In the early years of foreign securities regulation this competitive 
balance was still tilted towards leveling the playing field between U.S. 
and foreign issuers.  In 1977, this resulted in foreign private issuer 
disclosure being enhanced.  These proposed rules were officially 
adopted in 1979.14  The competitive parity policy the rules enabled was 
reiterated in 1983.  In that year the SEC closed the exemption from 
registration for NASDAQ quoted foreign private issuers despite 133 
comment letters protesting the rule’s adoption.15  The ability of foreign 
private issuers to be listed or quoted on a U.S. exchange without 
registering their shares with the SEC was thus severely limited. 
In 1982, the SEC also adopted an integrated disclosure system for 
foreign private issuers offering securities.  The SEC stated that “in 
developing the proposals the Commission sought to balance the policies 
of protecting investors by requiring substantially the same disclosure 
from domestic and foreign issuers and of promoting the public interest 
by encouraging foreign issuers to register their securities with the 
Commission.”16  Again disclosure parity was echoed: “ultimately, both 
domestic and foreign issuers should be subject to virtually identical 
disclosure requirements.”17  This and the 1983 elimination of the 
NASDAQ exemption were the last hurrahs.  The perceived competitive 
need to draw more foreign private issuers to the U.S. listing market 
would push the SEC to reweigh its interest group balancing. 
This balance began shifting in the 1980s.  During this time period, a 
 13. Id. at 88,706. 
 14. Rules, Registration and Annual Report Form for Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act 
Release No. 16,371, [1979–1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,363 (Nov. 29, 1979).  
The SEC received sixty-one more comments letters, which were again, almost uniformly opposed to the 
action.  The SEC also rejected these comments.  Id. at 82,550. 
 15. Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6493, [1983–1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,435, at 86,294 (Oct. 6, 1983).  See also Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(d)(3), 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(d) (2010). 
 16. Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 19,258, 
[1982–1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Dec. 6, 1982). 
 17. This principle was also reiterated in the proposing release for these rules.  See Integrated 
Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 18,279, [1981–1982 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,054, at 84,643 (Nov. 20, 1981). 
5
Davidoff: RHETORIC AND REALITY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE REGULATION
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
DAVIDOFF FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:04:50 PM 
624 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
new architecture was set in place.18  The disclosure requirements for 
foreign private issuers would be reduced.  Rules were promulgated or 
maintained for foreign private issuers to be exempt from filing quarterly 
reports, proxy requirements, § 16 requirements, and Form 8-K 
requirements.19  A mutual recognition scheme for Canadian issuers was 
also promulgated because “U.S. requirements reportedly continue to 
deter foreign companies from entering the U.S. markets.”20  A concept 
release on facilitating multi-jurisdictional offers was issued in 1985; 
Regulation S was adopted in 1990; Rule 144A was codified in 1990; and 
the SEC began to embrace IOSCO disclosure principals following a 
1986 conference in Paris.  This continued into the 1990s with the 
adoption of Universal Shelf Registration for foreign private issuers and 
cross-border exemptions for merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions.21 
As a result, foreign private issuers, who wanted to use the U.S. 
exchanges for a listing, quotation, or otherwise offer securities to the 
U.S. public, would be subject to Form 20-F reporting requirements.  
These reporting requirements required reconciliation with U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP) and Williams Act takeover 
strictures.  For those who simply wanted to stay away from U.S. 
markets, Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b) maintained an open avenue to a 
listing on the pink sheets without requiring SEC registration.22 
 18. For a history of these developments, see Edward F. Greene & Linda C. Quinn, Building on 
the International Convergence of Global Markets: A Model for Securities Law Reform, in 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 2003: EMERGING BEST PRACTICES FOR A RAPIDLY EVOLVING 
REGULATORY SCHEME app’x. I (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B0-01TL, 
2003) WL 1372 PLI/Corp 561. 
 19. See Franklin R. Edwards, Listing of Foreign Securities on U.S. Exchanges, in MODERNIZING 
U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Lehn & Kahmphuis, Jr. eds., 
1992). 
 20. Multijurisdictional Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 27,055, [1989 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,432, at 80,286 (Aug. 4, 1989).  At the time there were one hundred fifty 
foreign securities traded on a U.S. exchange and two hundred ninety-one quoted on NASDAQ, ninety-
nine of which were on the National Market System.  Id. at 80, 284.  The multijurisdictional disclosure 
system was adopted in 1991 with a release which echoed similar principles.  See Multijurisdictional 
Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, 
Exchange Act Release No. 29,354, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,812 (Jul. 1, 
1991). 
 21. Perhaps a seminal statement of the SEC approach at this time was embodied in Policy 
Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Regulation of International Securities 
Markets, Securities Act Release No. 6807 [1988–1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 84,341 (Nov. 1988).  The SEC stated “[a]s regulators seek to minimize differences between systems, 
the goal of investor protection should be balanced with the need to be responsive to the realities of each 
marketplace.”  Id. at 89,576. 
 22. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2010); see also Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or 
Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 BUS. LAW. 413 
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This was a species of mutual recognition.  Integrated disclosure 
would still be maintained, but beyond that regulation for these issuers 
would largely come from their home regulator.  This made sense at the 
time because the overwhelming majority of foreign private issuers were 
European and already regulated by their domestic regulator.  During this 
time period, the U.S. retail capital markets were considered more 
advanced.  A listing on the U.S. capital markets was viewed as raising 
the equity premium for a foreign company’s stock.  This may have been 
a result of multiple reasons such as bonding, liquidity, or capital markets 
arbitrage.23  Regardless of reasoning, it was clear that the U.S. offered 
an attractive retail market for European issuers.  This was not 
reciprocated for U.S. issuers.  Domestic issuers largely retained a sole 
listing in the United States and did not ventu 24
The cause of the SEC’s changing view of competitiveness was 
attributable to shifting market forces.  During this time, the NYSE 
prominently advocated for lighter regulation of foreign private issuers,25 
and large numbers of foreign private issuers actually began listing in the 
United States26  Chart I.A demonstrates the rise in foreign listings from 












 23. Why issuers cross-list is the subject of much debate.  See, e.g., Doidge et al., Private Benefits 
of Control, Ownership and the Cross-Listing Decision (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 11162, 2005), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/11162.html; Amir Licht, Cross-
Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141 (2003); William 
Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the 
United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66(1) J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2001). 
 24. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock 
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1765 (2002); 
Marco Pagano et al., The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?, 57 J. FIN. 
2651, 2652 (2002). 
 25. See, e.g., James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms 
Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S58 (1994); see also Roberta S. Karmel & Mary S. Head, 
Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry Into U.S. Markets, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1207 (1993). 
 26. See Greene & Quinn, supra note 18, at 619. 
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Chart I.A: Foreign Companies Listed on Major 






















































Countervailing interests towards heightened regulation included the 
public protection of investors and the need for equal competitive footing 
between domestic and foreign issuers.  The public interest lobby 
representing these two interests in the international securities realm was 
small.  In the absence of any strong opposing interests, interest group 
politics pushed the SEC towards the deregulation of foreign private 
issuers.  Unlike in 1977, the SEC was unable to ignore these interests.  It 
also helped that the SEC’s new regulation was in line with the rhetoric 
of “competitiveness,” as defined by the market at the time 
B. The Technology Bubble and International Securities Regulation 
The technology bubble started a gold rush.  Foreign private issuers 
flocked to the United States to capitalize on a market bubble equity 
premium.  The consequences were three-fold.  First, a record number of 
small foreign private issuers, mainly in the technology industry, listed in 
the United States.  Second, foreign private issuers increasingly spurned a 
listing in their domestic market, making the U.S. stock market their 
primary, if not only, listing.  Third, foreign private issuers from outside 
 
 27. Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Financing Trends in the United States 
Securities Markets (1995). 
8
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Europe emerged as a significant source of U.S. listings.  Chart I.B shows 



































The figures in Chart I.B demonstrate the increase in foreign private 
issuers registered with the SEC during the time of the technology 
bubble.  During this time period, the type of issuer and their reason for 
listing changed.  These issuers were smaller and more geographically 
diverse than issuers from prior decades.  These new foreign issuers came 
to the United States in search of a market-skewed equity premium rather 
than for status, an acquisition currency, liquidity, or other reasons earlier 
foreign private issuers cited for listing in the United States. 
These foreign companies were like many domestic technology 
companies during the technology bubble; they should never have listed 
in the United States.  In the wake of the bubble and the increased 
regulatory costs imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley, many smaller technology 
companies were left with a U.S. listing they did not desire and could not 
maintain.  But the U.S. securities law system at the time could best be 
described as a lobster trap or the Hotel California.  Once you listed, it 
was almost impossible to deregister and remove your listing.  You could 
check in any time, but you could never leave.29  This led to a large cadre 
 
 28. World Fed. of Exchs., Number of Companies with Shares Listed, http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual (follow “1996” hyperlink; then follow “Equity Markets” hyperlink; then 
follow “Number of Companies with Shares Listed” hyperlink; repeat through 2003) (last visited Feb. 20, 
2011). 
 29. See Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of 
9
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of trapped foreign private issuers. 
This phenomenon coincided with a second problem caused by the 
popping of the technology bubble: foreign private issuers stopped 
coming to the United States.  This development provided ammunition to 
outside interest groups promoting deregulation of foreign private issuers 
listed in the United States.  These interest groups attributed the listing 
shortage to Sarbanes–Oxley, asserting that it created a hostile regulatory 
regime and environment.30 
The issue was far more complex.  Issuers tend not to cross-list, but 
when they do they have historically listed in the United States.  In the 
wake of the technology bubble and the accompanying worldwide 
recession, companies stopped cross-listing and engaging in initial public 
offerings.  In 2004, Hong Kong had only ten foreign companies listed.31  
This number remained unchanged as of 2008.  The Tokyo Stock 
Exchange declined from thirty such listings in 2004 to sixteen in 2008.  
The only bright spot was the LSE’s Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM), which became a refuge for small companies.  The flow to AIM 
was seen as a primary example of U.S. noncompetitiveness.32  However, 
many of these companies would not have qualified to list in the U.S.33 
The decline in foreign issuers listing in the United States was 
furthered by the rise of private and more complete equity markets, which 
provided an alternative capital raising outlet.  In the private realm, the 
market for foreign equity offered via Rule 144A exempt offerings in the 
U.S. exploded.  In 2006, Rule 144A equity offerings by foreign private 
issuers amounted to $162 billion.34  It was clear that a viable market 
alternative now existed in the United States to raise capital outside the 
public listing markets.  Claims of U.S. non-competitiveness were further 
buttressed by academic studies, which found a decline in U.S. equity 
premiums contemporaneous with the adoption of Sarbanes–Oxley.35  To 
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002). 
 30. See infra Part II.C. 
 31. See World Fed. of Exchanges, Annual Number of Listed Companies: 2008, 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2008/equity-markets/number-listed-companies-0 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2010). 
 32. See MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE 
US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ 
committees/CL116000pub/materials/library/NY_Schumer-Bloomberg_REPORT_FINAL.pdf. 
 33. Davidoff, supra note 4, at 145. 
 34. Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 
2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 340 (2008); William K. Sjostrom Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A 
Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409, 412 (2008). 
 35. See, e.g., Craig Doidge et al., Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? 
Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices over Time, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (2009); Kate Litvak, The Effect of 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Companies Cross-Listed in the U.S., 13 J. CORP. FIN. 195 (2007); 
10
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the extent non-U.S. issuers came to the United States in search of an 
equity premium, any such premium had disappeared or diminished.  The 
studies were not uniform, and could be criticized for their econometric 
techniques, but still it appeared that the vaunted U.S. equity premium 
had diminished, if not disappeared. 
C. The Interest Group Response to Perceived U.S. Non-Competitiveness 
The discontent of “trapped” foreign private issuers was eclipsed by 
the outcry of domestic issuers against the new strictures of Sarbanes–
Oxley.  In the wake of Sarbanes–Oxley, a skein of academic literature, 
supported by industry commentary expressed an opinion that provisions 
of the Act were ham-handed, over-broad, and too costly.36  This 
literature focused particularly on the costs imposed upon issuers by 
Sarbanes–Oxley’s § 404 requirements.37 
The purpose of this Article is not to re-debate Sarbanes–Oxley, but 
rather to examine how the post-Sarbanes–Oxley rhetoric shaped the 
SEC’s regulation of foreign private issuers.  This rhetoric was driven to 
a large extent by four ad-hoc committees and organizations which issued 
reports analyzing the efficacy of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.  These 
committees and organizations were the: (1) SEC Advisory Committee 
on Smaller Public Companies; (2) Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation; (3) McKinsey & Company Study; and (4) Commission on 
the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century. 
Roberta Romano in her article Does the Sarbanes–Oxley Act Have a 
Future? undertakes an in-depth survey of the four organizations’ 
work,38 but for the purposes of this Article, it is worth addressing their 
principal recommendations as it related to or discussed foreign private 
issuers and the need for competitive U.S. capita
Kate Litvak, The Long-Term Effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on Cross-Listing Premia, 14 EUR. FIN. 
MGMT. 875 (2008); Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 383 (2008); Luigi Zingales, Is the 
U.S. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive Edge? (The Initiative on Global Markets, The Univ. of 
Chicago Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1, 2007). 
 36. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
 37. See ADVISORY COMM. ON SMALLER PUB. COS., SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf 
[hereinafter SPC FINAL REPORT]; see also Joseph A. Grundfest & Steven E. Bochner, Fixing 404, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1643 (2007); Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings, Quality, and 
Stock Prices, 65 J. FIN. 1163 (2010). 
 38. Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes–Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 229 
(2009). 
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The SEC Advisory Committee primarily focused on Sarbanes–
Oxley’s affect on domestic issuers.39  The committee’s primary 
recommendation was an opt-in solution for small private issuers and 
§ 404 of Sarbanes–Oxley.  In supporting this position the committee 
stated: 
A number of data points lead us in this direction . . . . 
 Some companies are either going dark or going private or 
considering doing so; 
 The London Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
for smaller public companies is gaining momentum; 
 Foreign new listings in the United States during 2005 dropped 
considerably from the previous year; 
 Foreign issuers are departing from the U.S. market (and their 
institutional investors are voting for their going offshore); and 
 U.S. investors continue to invest in foreign securities even 
though the issuers are not subject to internal control requirements 
like those promulgated under Section 404. 
 Without deciding whether Section 404 is beneficial for investors in 
smaller public companies, we believe that in light of our reasons for 
recommending exemptive relief for these companies unless and until an 
appropriate framework for assessing their internal control is developed, 
permitting them to comply or take advantage of the relief is the 
appropriate course of action to recommend.40 
In other words, the protection of investors was trumped by the 
efficacy of deregulation in the name of competitiveness.  The 
competitive threat was the mostly foreign threat of non-U.S. issuers 
listing and raising capital abroad resulting in U.S. investors investing in 
such companies.  The linkage was curious as small U.S. issuers were 
quite unlikely to go abroad to raise capital, and historically, non-U.S. 
issuers were similarly unlikely to seek a U.S. listing.41  The perceived 
loss of U.S. international competitiveness in this case justified against 
the investor protection balance set by the committee. 
The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR) was formed 
in September 2006.  The CCMR was a private creation but was 
apparently formed at the suggestion of then Secretary of Treasury Hank 
Paulson.42  The CCMR acted expeditiously and issued its first interim 
report on November 30, 2006.43  The tenor of the report is best reflected 
 39. SPC FINAL REPORT, supra note 37. 
 40. Id. at 41–42 (internal citations omitted). 
 41. Davidoff, supra note 4. 
 42. Romano, supra note 38, at 244. 
 43. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL 
MARKETS REGULATION (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ 
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by its statement in the executive summary that the “evidence 
presented . . . suggests that the United States is losing its leading 
competitive position as compared to stock markets and financial centers 
abroad.”44  The report stated that this was due to four reasons: 
(i) an increase in the integrity of and trust in major foreign public markets 
resulting from more transparency and better disclosure; (ii) a relative 
increase in the liquidity of foreign and private markets, thus making it 
less necessary to go to the U.S. public equity capital markets for funding; 
(iii) improvements in technology, making it easier for U.S. investors to 
invest in foreign markets; and (iv) differences in the legal rules governing 
the U.S. public markets and the foreign and private alternatives.45 
The CCMR made a number of recommendations with respect to 
regulation of both domestic and foreign issuers, but in the international 
securities realm made a relatively modest recommendation that new 
foreign private issuers should be allowed to reserve the right to 
deregister and that current foreign private issuers should be allowed to 
exclude institutional investors for purposes of calculating their U.S. 
shareholder base.46  The report’s low-key recommendation was 
presumably based on a countervailing tension cited in its report to 
balance deregulation of foreign private issuers against “protecting retail 
investors.”47 
The CCMR issued a second report on December 4, 2007.48  The 
report labeled itself “a second wake-up call” and began by stating that 
“[b]y any meaningful measure, the competitiveness of the U.S. public 
equity market has deteriorated significantly in recent years.”49  The 
committee did not make any recommendation in this report but 
highlighted the U.S. competitive decline it found.  The alarmed tone of 
its second report was a bit surprising because the main recommendation 
of the report—at least to the extent it dealt with foreign private issuers—
had been adopted in March of 2007.  This may have been due to the 
institutionalization of the CCMR at Harvard Law School, and an 
apparent reassessment of its prior recommendations.  Nonetheless, the 
CCMR has continued this siren call up to this date, claiming that the 
11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. 
 44. Id. at ix. 
 45. Id. at 4–5. 
 46. Id. at 66. 
 47. Id. at 7, 50. 
 48. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC 
EQUITY MARKET (2007), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ 
The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf. 
 49. Id. at v, 1. 
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U.S. competitive position is in perilous decline.50 
The McKinsey & Company Study was commissioned by New York 
City’s Economic Development Corporation and was supported by New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles Schumer.  
The report was issued on January 22, 2007 and sounded similar alarm 
bells about the decline of U.S. competitiveness.51  The study stated 
“[t]he threat to US and New York global financial services leadership is 
real. . . . It is clear that the country and the City need to take this threat 
seriously.”52  The study found that America was failing to compete on a 
real and a “perceptions” basis, and the study made eight “critically 
important” near-term and long-term recommendations.53  The first 
recommendation was for relaxation of Sarbanes–Oxley’s requirements, 
particularly with respect to § 404 and its application to small issuers.54  
Embedded in this recommendation was another recommendation that the 
SEC should “exempt foreign companies that comply with the corporate 
governance standards of SEC-approved foreign regulators from also 
having to comply with the requirements of Sarbanes–Oxley.”55  The 
second recommendation—securities litigation reform—was the bug-bear 
of many.56  The other significant recommendation with respect to 
foreign private issuers was to “[r]ecognize IFRS without reconciliation 
and promote convergence of accounting and auditing standards.”57  This 
report was a direct blow against regulation of foreign private issuers.  
Accordingly, the mention of retail investors and protection of their 
interests was absent from the report.  Not surprisingly, given that a 
consulting firm was retained to prepare this report with a specific goal in 
mind—U.S. capital markets competitiveness—there were no 
countervailing interests to consider. 
The final study was the Commission on the Regulation of U.S. 
Capital Markets in the 21st Century established by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce in February of 2006.  The committee issued its report in 
 50. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, AMID PLUNGING IPO ACTIVITY IN 2008, 
CCMR FINDS THAT U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET COMPETITIVENESS CONTINUES ITS DECLINE (2008), 
available at http://investment.verticalnews.com/articles/936560.html. 
 51. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ 
ny_report_final.pdf. 
 52. Id. at 10. 
 53. Id. at 19–28. 
 54. Id. at 99. 
 55. Id. at 99–100. 
 56. Id. at 100. 
 57. Id. at 109–110. 
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March 2007.58  The report argued that “[u]nfortunately, the competitive 
position of our capital markets is under strain—from increasingly 
competitive international markets and the need to modernize our legal 
and regulatory frameworks.”59  The report noted the tension between 
“protecting investors and promoting capital formation” but highlighted 
the same figures as the McKinsey report and the CCMR to show that 
companies were no longer opting to list in the United States in the same 
number as in prior years.60  The report was more receptive to 
countervailing evidence than either the McKinsey study or the CCMR 
reports.  The report stated: 
One study from Ernst & Young notes that, during the first half of 2006, 
there were 77 IPOs that listed outside their domicile country, yet only 17 
of these actually represented “in-play” IPOs, or those presenting 
competitive opportunity for U.S. markets.  Of those 17, 11 did list on a 
U.S exchange.  This suggests that the competitive position of the United 
States for in-play IPOs has not dramatically deteriorated, despite the 
larger shifts in capital market dynamics.61 
The committee largely focused on domestic issues but recommended 
substituted compliance.62  This was an idea put forth by Ethiopis Tafara 
and Robert J. Peterson in 2007.63  Substituted compliance, as proposed 
by Tafara and Peterson, is a system wherein foreign stock exchanges and 
broker–dealers apply to the SEC for an exemption from SEC 
registration.  This exemption would be premised on oversight and 
compliance with the laws of a foreign jurisdiction with comparable 
securities laws.64  This was not full mutual recognition because it did not 
include listings—only brokers and exchanges.  Still, it was a significant 
step towards this goal.  The committee also recommended increasing 
convergence between U.S. GAAP and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as well as a system of mutual recognition for all IFRS 
issuers.65 
These reports demonstrate that the discourse surrounding foreign 
 58. COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), available at 
http://library.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/0703capmarkets_full.pdf [hereinafter COMM’N 
REPORT]. 
 59. Id. at 4. 
 60. Id. at 1, 17. 
 61. Id. at 20 (internal citations omitted). 
 62. Id. at 36–40. 
 63. Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for cross-border Access to U.S. Investors: 
A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007). 
 64. Id. at 32. 
 65. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 58, at 47–48. 
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private issuer regulation was phrased as a need to keep U.S. markets 
competitive.  This competition required reducing regulation on non-U.S. 
issuers.  To the extent that the protection of “retail investors” or other 
domestic interests mitigated the status quo or increased regulation, the 
requirement of competitiveness militated against these interests. 
The competitiveness of the United States in attracting foreign private 
issuers was used as evidence to argue for reduced burdens on small 
issuers.  In part this was because the foreign private issuer market 
appeared to provide the best evidence for an argument that the United 
States capital markets were in decline.  However, these are different 
markets, and equating the two is a subtle matter.  There were increased 
burdens placed on smaller issuers, but these may have been unrelated to 
the actions and regulation of foreign private issuers.  It may not have 
even been the proper connection.  Lately, the decline in small issuer 
initial public offerings (IPOs) is attributed more to market structure, the 
rise of online brokerages, and the decline in volume of investment 
banking analyst research rather than Sarbanes–Oxley.66  This alternative 
explanation is supported by the fact that the decline in small issuer IPOs 
traces back before the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley and the decline in 
foreign private issuer listings.  The decline of both was nonetheless an 
easy touchstone to argue for a roll-back of Sarbanes–Oxley.  Equating 
the two and tying the two issues to a United States in competitive 
decline was both politically astute and fit the rhetoric of the four reports. 
Roberta Romano documents a rise in news discourse, and 
congressional attention to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in tandem with the 
creation and reports of these committees.  The purpose of her article is to 
analyze the news and legislative atmosphere spurring and surrounding 
potential legislative reform of Sarbanes–Oxley.  Two of the phrases she 
tracks in the national news media are clearly those of rhetorical flourish: 
“Market Competitiveness” and “Foreign-Market Competitiveness.”67  
Not surprisingly, she finds that the phrase “Market Competitiveness” 
appeared in national newspapers only four times in 2004, but seventy-
five in 2006.68  She finds three and fifty-seven mentions of “foreign 
market competitiveness” in 2004 and 2006, respectively.69  She 
attributes this rhetorical atmosphere to an increase in willingness by 
 66. DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, GRANT THORNTON LLP, MARKET STRUCTURE IS CAUSING 
THE IPO CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/ 
Public%20companies%20and%20capital%20markets/Files/IPO%20crisis%20-%20Sep%202009%20-
%20FINAL.pdf. 
 67. Romano, supra note 38, at 312. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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legislators to reconsider Sarbanes–Oxley.70 
D. The SEC Response 
The SEC, under the stewardship of Christopher Cox, responded.  The 
SEC undertook four significant actions with respect to foreign private 
issuers from 2005 to 2008.  These actions were: 
1. The SEC delayed the application of Sarbanes–Oxley’s Rule 404 
for several years to allow for foreign private issuers to prepare 
for the requirement and for implementing regulation on the 
subject;71 
2. The rules governing cross-border tender offers, exchange offers, 
rights offerings, and business combinations were relaxed to 
further accommodate these transactions;72 
3. The SEC adopted rules allowing for the deregistration and 
delisting of foreign private issuers and Rule 12g32-b was further 
amended to accommodate for exemptions there under;73 and 
4. Non-U.S. issuers were allowed to use IFRS for their U.S. 
reporting requirements.74 
The last two actions were particularly consequential.  The biggest 
impediment to a U.S. listing has always been the U.S. GAAP 
reconciliation requirements.  European issuers had to spend months, 
sometimes years, working with local auditors to prepare these 
statements.75  Local auditors from global accounting firms were 
attempting to learn and implement U.S. GAAP by correspondence with 
their U.S. counterpart offices.  The consequence was that the U.S. 
GAAP reconciliation requirements were the principal impediment to a 
 70. Id. at 305–06. 
 71. See Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers: How the 
U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as the World’s Principal 
Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 118 (2006). 
 72. See Guidance and Revisions to the cross-border Tender Offer, Exchange Offerings and 
Business Combination Rules and Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules for Certain Foreign Institutions, 
Exchange Act Release No. 58,597, [2008 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,286 (Sep. 19, 
2008) [hereinafter Cross-Border Release]. 
 73. Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s Registration of a Class of Securities Under Section 
12(G) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 13(A) or 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Exchange Act Release No. 55,540, [2006–2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,785 
(Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Deregistration Adopting Release]. 
 74. Use of IFRS Without GAAP Reconciliation, Exchange Act Release No. 57,026, [2007–2008 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,032 (Dec. 21, 2007) [hereinafter IFRS Adopting 
Release]. 
 75. I practiced as a corporate attorney in Europe from 2000 to 2005, and I can assure you that it 
was an excruciatingly slow and inexact process. 
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U.S. listing.76  Perversely some large market European issuers 
deliberately listed in the United States for anti-takeover purposes.77  
This made it almost impossible for one of their non-U.S. listed 
counterparts to bid for them as they would inherit the U.S. GAAP 
registration requirements, which were impracticable to comply with in a 
timely ma
The relaxation of this entry listing requirement was complimented by 
eliminating the restrictions on exit from the U.S. markets.  The adoption 
of new Exchange Act rules in March 2007 allowed non-U.S. issuers to 
freely delist and terminate their registration under § 12(g), thus 
absolving them from any duty to file reports under § 13(a) or § 15(d) of 
the Exchange Act.78  Approximately seventy-five foreign private issuers 
deregistered their shares in the fifteen month period after the rule’s 
adoption.79  In September 2008, the SEC relaxed the Rule 12g32-b 
exemption by eliminating the written application and paper submission 
requirements.80  This further stream-lined the U.S. market exit process.  
The SEC now had a solution for foreign private issuers who complained 
bitterly about § 404 and other U.S. regulations—you are free to go at 
any time. 
The consequence was to open the toll road into and out of the United 
States.  Foreign private issuers could now, with relative ease, list and 
delist from the United States.  Some foreign acquirers, when listing, 
stated the clear intent to delist in a year, registering only for purposes of 
an acquisition.  This most prominently occurred in the $144 billion 
business combination of the French companies Suez and Gaz de France.  
Suez specifically stated in its 571 page registration statement that it 
would deregister the shares it was registering and listing once the one-
year time period under Rule 12g32-b elapsed.81 
This was a marked departure from almost thirty years of SEC rule-
making, which had at least required U.S. GAAP and imposed real 
substantive elements on foreign private issuers accessing the U.S. retail 
market.  It was an inevitable result of the SEC departure from equivalent 
 76. See Kun Young Chang, Reforming U.S. Disclosure Rules in Global Securities Markets, 22 
ANN REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 237, 241 (2003). 
 77. See Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International 
Securities Transactions, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 93–94. 
 78. Deregistration Adopting Release, supra note 73. 
 79. Craig Doidge et al., Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?, 65(4) J. OF FIN. 
1507, 1516 (2010). 
 80. Deregistration Adopting Release, supra note 73. 
 81. See Posting of Steven M. Davidoff to N.Y. Times DealBook, 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/17/french-deal-american-red-tape/ (June 17, 2008, 11:00 
AM). 
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disclosure between foreign private issuers and domestic issuers towards 
a competitive advantage in drawing these issuers to the United States.  It 
was also recognition of the difficulty of maintaining fences around 
global capital. 
E. Analysis of the Releases 
The rhetoric driving this expansive rule-making was echoed in the 
adopting and proposing releases for these SEC actions.  Take the new 
deregistration requirements long advocated by practitioners and foreign 
private issuers.  In the first proposing release issued on December 23, 
2005, the SEC asserted that “market globalization” and “advances in 
information technology” had resulted in a significant increase in 
“foreign companies that have engaged in cross-border activities and 
sought listings in U.S. securities markets.”82 
The statement seems to be typical of our time—capital markets are 
globalizing and changing.  Who could argue with that?  What was 
notable about this release was that nowhere did it mention the interests 
or protection of “retail investors.”  As for global competition, this was 
both an implicit and explicit premise behind the rule proposal.  The SEC 
release cited as the primary justification for the proposed rule-making 
criticism by representatives of foreign companies and foreign industry 
associations of the requirement that a foreign private issuer could not 
deregister unless it was below the “300 U.S. resident shareholder” test.83  
The SEC also considered the effect of these rules on competition as 
required by § 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act.  The SEC concluded that: 
[b]y providing increased flexibility for foreign private issuers regarding 
our Exchange Act reporting system, the proposed rules would encourage 
foreign companies to participate in U.S. capital markets as Exchange Act 
reporting companies to the benefit of investors.  In so doing, the proposed 
rules should foster increased competition between domestic and foreign 
firms for investors in U.S. capital markets.84 
The release was also distinguishable for its failure to mention retail 
investor protection and countervailing investor protection 
considerations.  Instead, the requirements of “globalization” and 
 82. Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s Registration of a Class of Securities Under Section 
12(G) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 13(A) or 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Exchange Act Release No. 53,020, [2005–2006 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,515, at 
82,837 (Dec. 23, 2005). 
 83. Id. at 82,837–38. 
 84. Id. at 82,860–61. 
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“competition” drove this rule-making.85  Foreign interests and the need 
to bring their listings to the United States militated this rule revision.  It 
was no longer 1977.  To the extent the interests of retail investors were 
relevant, the rule would bring more competition between domestic and 
foreign competitors for U.S. capital.  No supporting citation was 
provided to this principle. 
This was reiterated in the second proposing release issued on 
December 22, 2006.86  The primary purpose of the newly reproposed 
rule was to put forth a more friendly foreign private-issuer test based on 
average daily trading volume.  This alternative test was instead of two 
others.  The first was that the foreign private issuer be a well-known 
seasoned issuer and have been a reporting issuer in the United States for 
the prior two years.  The second was a hybrid U.S. public float and U.S. 
trading volume test.87  These alternative tests had been criticized in the 
majority of the fifty comment letters the SEC received in response to the 
first release, on the grounds that they would unduly inhibit a significant 
“portion of U.S. registered foreign private issuers from exiting the 
Exchange Act.”88 
The interests of retail investors now made their appearance.  The SEC 
justified this rule change when weighed against the need to protect retail 
investors because: 
 [w]e believe the reproposed rules appropriately provide meaningful 
protection of U.S. investors by permitting the termination of Exchange 
Act registration and reporting only by foreign registrants in whose U.S. 
registered securities relative U.S. market interest is low.  We believe the 
proposed conditions governing eligibility to use the trading volume-based 
measure, along with the other proposed conditions concerning prior 
Exchange Act reporting, the prohibition against recent registered U.S. 
offerings, and required foreign listing should further serve to protect U.S. 
investors.89 
In other words, the SEC’s protective concern was ensuring that only 
foreign private issuers with limited trading volume could deregister.  
This may have been a valid interest, but any countervailing interests 
were not discussed.  Such interests could have encompassed the effects 
 85. Id. at 82,838–40. 
 86. Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s Registration of a Class of Securities Under Section 
12(G) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 13(A) or 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Exchange Act Release No. 55,005, [2006–2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,735 
(Dec. 22, 2006). 
 87. Id. at 84,001. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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of such a departure on U.S. investors who were stuck holding securities 
with lesser protections than initially required at the time of the investors’ 
purchase.  Instead, the argument had been channeled by the SEC staff 
into a question of what would be in the best interests of foreign private 
issuers.  The SEC adopted these rules with some amendments to make 
them more foreign private issuer friendly, and they became effective on 
June 4, 2007.90 
The other significant, indeed revolutionary, SEC action during this 
time with respect to foreign private issuers was the adoption of rules 
allowing foreign private issuers to meet their accounting disclosure 
requirements with financial statements prepared in accordance with 
IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board.  The 
adoption of a release allowing foreign private issuers to use IFRS was 
the culmination of almost twenty years of study on the matter.  The 
current effort had begun in February 2000 when the SEC issued a 
Concept Release on International Accounting Standards.  The proposing 
release specifically cited the goal of harmonization.  This was affirmed 
by SEC Chairman Cox, who in February 2006 stated his commitment to 
the “Roadmap” provided by SEC Chief Accountant, Donald Nicolaisen, 
in April 2005.  The roadmap had set forth the goal of achieving one set 
of high quality, globally accepted accounting standards.91  The 
proposing release detailed these efforts in five pages as part of a 
historical path for a “robust process for convergence.”92 
What was the justification for this change?  The SEC revisited the 
parity argument previously raised in 1977.  It is worth quoting from at 
length: 
 Given the dual considerations of investor protection and even-
handedness towards foreign private issuers, the Commission has framed 
its consideration of the reconciliation requirement as a balancing of two 
policy concerns: investors’ need for the same type of basic information 
when making an investment decision regardless of whether the issuer is 
foreign or domestic, and the public interest served by an opportunity to 
invest in a variety of securities, including foreign securities.  Investors’ 
need for the same type of basic information implies that foreign and 
domestic registrants should be subject to the same disclosure 
requirements.  However, the burden on foreign issuers of meeting the 
 90. Deregistration Adopting Release, supra note 73, at 84,472. 
 91. Donald T. Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, 25 NW. J. INT’L L & 
BUS. 661 (2005). 
 92. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared In Accordance 
with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to GAAP, Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 8818, (Jul. 2, 2007) [hereinafter IFRS Proposing Release], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/33-8818.pdf. 
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identical disclosure standards as domestic issuers might discourage them 
from offering their securities on the U.S. market.  If foreign issuers chose 
not to offer their securities in the United States, it would deprive U.S. 
investors of investment opportunities and potentially compel them to 
purchase foreign securities on foreign markets, where disclosure may be 
less than that required in filings with the Commission.93 
The adoption of IFRS was controversial.94  In response to the 
proposing release, the SEC received 125 comment letters,95 many of 
which highlighted the need to retain U.S. GAAP for investor protection 
purposes.  A subset of these letters raised alarm that IFRS would sow 
confusion among retail investors.  The SEC rejected these concerns 
stating that “these amendments will help investors to understand 
international investment opportunities more clearly” than reliance on a 
multiplicity of accounting standards.96  If this was a problem, educating 
investors would enable them to further understand the different 
accounting rules.  The SEC stated: 
Due to the cost to issuers of preparing the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP 
from IFRS, we believe that the amendments are likely to promote 
efficiency by eliminating financial disclosure that is costly to produce.  
We believe that investors would have adequate information on which to 
base their investment decisions and that capital may be allocated on a 
more efficient basis.97 
The competitive rationale underlying the SEC’s attempts to lighten the 
burden on foreign private issuers had dominated. 
The proposing and adopting releases put forth a world view where the 
needs of foreign private issuers due to “globalization” and “competition” 
necessitated change.  To the extent that the needs of retail investors were 
accounted for, the debate was phrased in terms of the benefits that 
foreign investors would receive by access to these investments.  The 
needs of domestic issuers for a level playing field, as cited in 1977, had 
been disregarded for a desire to provide access to these issuers.  A 
justification for this access was ironically the large number of issuers 
who now had listed in the United States.  The parity argument invoked 
in 1977 was flipped on its head. 
The SEC did not cite any countervailing principles.  The SEC 
articulated its needs and priorities, measuring them through the comment 
 93. Id. at 12. 
 94. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic Appraisal 
of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 95. IFRS Adopting Release, supra note 74, at 85,758. 
 96. Id. at 85,763. 
 97. Id. at 85,785. 
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process.  The SEC was also particular in recognizing its preferred 
interest groups.  In the case of these two rule-makings, the SEC spun the 
comments to reflect its agenda. 
The SEC is not governed by the government Office of Management 
and Budget requirements for cost–benefit analysis.  Nevertheless, the 
SEC’s adopting releases for IFRS and the deregistration rules contained 
sections entitled “cost-benefit” analysis.  A review of this section in each 
release reveals that while the SEC attempted to quantify some savings 
and costs, it was not the rigorous review advocated by many.98  There 
was no real weighing or analysis.  Reviewing the sections, it appears as 
results-driven as the remainder of the adopting releases. 
It is useful to contrast the SEC’s IFRS and deregistration rule-making 
with the case of the cross-border release and the rules it adopted during 
this same period.  In that release, the SEC sought to update the cross 
border exemptions it had adopted in 1999.  In the case of the cross-
border release, twenty-two comment letters were submitted, many of 
which noted significant problems with imposing U.S. regulation on 
cross-border transactions and criticizing the manner the SEC determined 
these exemptions.99  Despite criticism from law firms and 
representatives of foreign organizations, the SEC resisted the industry 
and foreign comment letters and refused to adopt more lenient rules in 
the name of investor protection.  The SEC stated “[w]e believe the 
revisions appropriately balance the need to protect U.S. investors 
through the application of protections afforded by U.S. law, while 
facilitating transactions that may benefit all security holders, including 
those in the United States.”100  Unlike IFRS and the deregistration 
release, the SEC struck the balance of investor protection in favor of 
more regulation. 
The difference was likely in the atmosphere of the time and the 
surrounding interest group rhetoric.  The IFRS and deregistration 
releases were the subject of outside reports and congressional scrutiny.  
The adoption of these two agendas was covered extensively in the news.  
They were also trumpeted by the SEC as signs of the organization’s 
responsiveness to threats to U.S. competition and criticism of Sarbanes–
Oxley.  The European Union lobbied heavily for this rule change.101  
These two actions allowed the SEC to appear responsive to the most 
vocal and powerful interest groups within the debate. 
 98. See infra note 133. 
 99. Cross-Border Release, supra note 72, at 87,174–79.  The SEC comments are available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-08/s71008.shtml (last visited Dec. 31, 2009). 
 100. Id. at 87,171. 
 101. Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L. REV. 1692 (2008). 
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In contrast, the cross-border release adopted rules that were the arcane 
province of the M&A office of the SEC.102  There was no reporting on 
the release in the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal.103  The 
attention this rule-change brought was primarily from law firms and 
some foreign practitioner organizations.104  In other words, the interest 
group mix at the time and the public rhetoric surrounding this release 
was akin to the interest group circumstances existent in 1977 when the 
SEC began its integration project.  The SEC thus again felt safe ignoring 
this criticism. 
In all of this rule-making, not one of the releases cited any committee 
reports discussed in Section II.C except for the SEC-established one.  
There is still no doubt that the SEC was operating in an atmosphere in 
which it was well aware of the public rhetoric surrounding these issues.  
In speeches and testimony, the SEC commissioners paid heed to these 
reports and claims of a U.S. capital markets decline.105  The staff also 
noted this in conferences and articles.  News reports quoted government 
officials as being aware of and responsive to the change demanded by 
interest groups.106  This SEC rule-making was made in an environment 
ripe for change beneficial toward foreign private issuers. 
F. The State of Play 
The regulatory landscape for foreign private issuers was substantially 
reshaped by the time the SEC finished.  Sure, the pesky requirement of 
Sarbanes–Oxley certification embodied in § 404 could not be 
 102. Brett A. Carron & Steven M. Davidoff, Getting U.S. Security Holders to the Party: The 
SEC’s Cross-Border Release Five Years On, 12 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455 (2005). 
 103. Westlaw and Lexis searches with date restriction of 2008 (search: takeover or merger or 
cross w/2 border and SEC). 
 104. See SEC Comments, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-08/s71008.shtml (last visited Dec. 
31, 2009). 
 105. See, e.g., Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Consumer 
Federation of America Financial Services Conference (Dec. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch120106rcc.htm; Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Regulation Outside the United States (Mar. 8, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807rcc.htm. 
 106. Senator Evan Bayh et al., Sen. Evan Bayh Holds a Hearing on Financial Regulation (Sept. 
30, 2009), available at http://findarticles.com/p/news-articles/political-transcript-wire/mi_8167/ 
is_20090930/sen-evan-bayh-holds-hearing/ai_n50936916/pg_5/; International Cooperation to 
Modernize Financial Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & Int’l Trade & Fin., Comm. 
on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs (2009) (testimony of Daniel K. Tarullo, U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd.), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20090930a.htm.  See also 
Jeffrey Deane &Peter Kern, Ready for Global Financial Standards?, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 22, 
2009, at C1. 
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eliminated.107  But foreign private issuers coming to the United States 
faced a regulatory skein where they could raise capital on the public 
markets and if desired, escape relatively soon thereafter.  Moreover, this 
capital raising was made significantly easier by the elimination of the 
U.S. GAAP reconciliation requirement. 
As the financial markets have recovered in the wake of the financial 
crisis, foreign private issuers have returned to the United States.  In 
2009, fourteen foreign private issuers IPOs were announced raising 
$10.3 billion.108  This compares to forty-seven domestic issuers raising 
$16.70 billion.109  The source of these issuers was China and outside 
Europe.  Eleven of these IPOs were from mainland China, one from 
Hong Kong, one from Singapore, and one from Brazil.  None were from 
Europe.110  At first blush, this data provides affirmation for the “no one 
is coming here” argument.  But the LSE had only two IPOs in 2009.  
The AIM had nine IPOs in total for the same year.  In other words, no 
one at all was going to London.111  Worldwide IPO flow shifted 
primarily to China and secondarily to the United States.  The Hong 
Kong Exchange had twenty-one IPOs and the Shenzen Exchange forty 
IPOs.112  Meanwhile the NYSE had thirty-five IPOs and the NASDAQ 
had twenty-six IPOs.113 
China may be dominating IPOs, but this is largely the result of rising 
domestic markets.  Given the penchant of issuers to raise capital in their 
domestic markets, this is to be expected.114  The U.S. is the only 
competitor right now for foreign listings.  In 2009, the London Stock 
Exchange received one foreign listing, the AIM two foreign listings and 
 107. The SEC did act to provide some measure of regulatory relief to small issuers.  See Internal 
Control over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers and 
Newly Public Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8731, Exchange Act Release No. 54,295, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 47,060 (proposed Aug. 9, 2006).  The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act eliminated the requirements for non-accelerated filers to comply with Section 404.  Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989G, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1948 (July 21, 2010).  Non-accelerated filers have an aggregate worldwide market value of voting 
and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates of less than $75 million.  17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 
(2010). 
 108. Dealogic Database (search data on file with author). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Press Release, Thomson Reuters, Thomson Reuters Year-End Equity Capital Markets 
Review 2009, at 7 (2009), http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/deo/pdf/ 
Prelim_Capital_Markets_Press_Release_4Q09.pdf.  Moreover, there has been a flight of foreign issuers 
from the AIM of late. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Dealogic Database, supra note 108. 
 114. See Sergei Sarkissian, The Overseas Listing Decision: New Evidence of Proximity 
Preference, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 769 (2004). 
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the Tokyo Stock Exchange no foreign listings.115  To the extent there is 
a global listing market, the United States as of 2009 still dominated, 
regardless of how small the market is.116 
If one believes that the need for European issuers to come to the U.S. 
is diminished due to either a lower premium or maturation of their own 
markets, these statistics superficially support that view.  European 
issuers are not listing generally, but they are certainly not listing in the 
United States when they do list.  Moreover, issuers are cross-listing less 
than they previously did before.117  This may be due to the inevitable 
maturation of European markets and the recognition that the U.S. market 
no longer has rents with respect to European issuers.  It also may be due 
to bubble like conditions in prior years, which over-inflated this flow.  
Added to the mix are U.S. regulations and a litigation environment, 
which many believe deters these listings.  However, if you believe the 
bonding hypothesis, or perhaps a hot money theory, China’s U.S. listing 
wave appears to provide evidence to meet either one.  Chinese issuers 
are coming to the U.S. to raise capital and list, arriving from a less 
regulated and developed market to do so.  In 2009, Chinese issuers 
comprised 17.5% of the U.S. IPO market.118 
These Chinese issuers are undertaking U.S. IPOs using U.S. GAAP 
prepared financial statements.119  This is despite the fact that China has 
publicly announced its endorsement of IFRS and convergence.  In other 
words, the market still values U.S. GAAP.  It also may be a 
countervailing narrative to the need to allow IFRS or otherwise push for 
global accounting harmonization.  Chinese issuers are even filing for 
IPOs using the much more stringent domestic form of S-1 rather than F-
1, presumably for extra credibility.120  This is grist for the bonding story, 
and the value U.S. regulation and supervision has historically provided 
 115. Dealogic Database, supra note 108. 
 116. Langevoort notes that 
the United States no longer has a significant competitive advantage vis-à-vis other world 
markets in terms of technology, talent, or access to global wealth.  In other words, the 
United States no longer has rents that can compensate for—and thus mask—any 
suboptimal regulation.  Getting the regulatory balance right is therefore increasingly 
crucial. 
Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 
196 (2009). 
 117. Reese, Jr. & Weisbach, supra note 23, at 19–20, 39. 
 118. RENAISSANCE CAPITAL LLC, 2009 GLOBAL IPO MARKET REVIEW AND 2010 OUTLOOK 5 
(2010), http://www.renaissancecapital.com/ipohome/review/2009Review.pdf. 
 119. See, e.g., Duoyuan Global Water Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 
1933, Form F-1, No. 333-159691, at F-1 (Filed June 24, 2009). 
 120. Davidoff, supra note 4. 
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to foreign private issuers.  The numbers are nonetheless too few to draw 
any definitive conclusions. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Wholesale SEC changes have made it easy for foreign private issuers 
to enter and exit the U.S. market.  Professors Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 
found seventy-five firms voluntary deregistered from the U.S. from 
March 21, 2007 through the end of 2008.121  This may evidence a flight 
from U.S. capital markets, but it may also be a result of pent up demand.  
Doidge and his co-authors found evidence that these deregistering 
issuers “grow more slowly, need less capital, and experience poor stock 
return performance” than non-deregistering foreign issuers.122 
Foreign securities regulation has remained a one-size-fits-all affair.  
Royal Dutch Shell is regulated at the same level as Chinese Duoyuan 
Global Water, a hot Chinese IPO on the NYSE in 2009.  Royal Dutch 
Shell is also listed on the LSE; Duoyuan Global is not listed anywhere 
else.  In some sense this has administrative and market appeal.  
Administratively, a single standard is easier to administer and sell to 
foreign private issuers.  This also allows the market to set varying levels 
of internalized governance and disclosure. 
The chances of successful litigation in the United States against a 
Chinese issuer are low, and a judgment in the United States is of little 
value.  One would likely have to litigate the issue in China in courts that 
are unfamiliar and, to put it bluntly, often do not follow the rule of 
law.123  Furthermore, foreign private issuers do not comply with 
disclosure requirements to the same extent.  Despite the efforts of some 
Chinese issuers, Chinese accounting principles are lacking.124  Chinese 
issuers often keep multiple sets of books and fudge numbers to meet 
internal targets.125  They do this assuming it will all work out in the end.  
One can believe that once they list in the U.S. and are required to 
comply with U.S. regulations they get religion, and some appear to do 
so, but I am skeptical that all do.  A perusal of SEC filings by these 
 121. Craig Doidge et al., Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?, 65 J. OF FIN. 1507, 
1516 (2010). 
 122. Id. at 1510–12. 
 123. See Donald C. Clarke, The Enforcement of United States Court Judgments in China: A 
Research Note (George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 
236, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 236, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=943922. 
 124. See Posting of Mark Dixon to N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2009/08/17/another-view-shanghai-ed-profits/ (Aug. 17, 2009, 10:00 AM). 
 125. See Leslie P. Norton, Who’s Minding the Minders of Chinese Accounting?, BARRON’S, Feb. 
18, 2008, at 36. 
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issuers also reveals that their accounting practices are often suspect—
some fail to file cash flow statements; others raise cash while having a 
significant amount of cash already on their balance sheet, which is a sign 
of possible fraud.126  A recent piece in Barron’s on Chinese listings in 
the United States raised similar concern about their accounting 
practices.127  This is particularly true because the financials are prepared 
locally by Chinese branches of U.S. firms with similar cultural norms. 
Foreign private issuers are different.  A sensible cost–benefit analysis, 
even Aristotle’s principle of equality, would indicate that the two should 
be regulated differently.  This would be true under other regulatory 
techniques, such as investor protection or integrity of the market 
analysis.  This Article suggests that if access to the U.S. retail market is 
provided to foreign private issuers then perhaps the level of regulation 
should be formally considered.  An appropriate implementation of the 
precautionary principle jibes with this.  The risk of a foreign private 
issuer acting inappropriately or defrauding U.S. investors likely 
mitigates some level of varying U.S. equivalent regulation.  An 
illustration of this is currently occurring with Novartis’s attempt to 
squeeze-out the minority shareholders of Alcon.  Alcon is organized 
under the laws of Switzerland but is listed only on the NYSE.  
Consequently, the Swiss Takeover Law and its minority protections do 
not apply, leaving Alcon’s shareholders without the protections they 
would receive for either a U.S. or Swiss domestic entity.  This is a fine 
example of regulatory arbitrage amidst the current SEC rules for foreign 
private issuers.128 
There are also certain issuers who pose more regulatory risk; analysis 
of that risk may require more regulation.  However, in the many releases 
issued in the past five years concerning international securities 
regulation, the SEC has not considered this issue, despite comment 
letters noting this problem.129  I also presume the SEC staff at the Office 
of International Affairs knows of these issues. 
I believe that the SEC did not consider these differences for four 
reasons.  First, heightened regulation did not fit within the rubric of 
“competitiveness” and “globalization” that was driving deregulation.  
Increased regulation would have been an opposite turn and counter to 
 126. Email from Hedge Fund Investor Arbitraging Chinese Issuers (June 22, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
 127. Norton, supra note 125. 
 128. See Editorial, Novartis’s Bid For Alcon: Minority Shareholders in Swiss Firms Have Fewer 
Rights than They Thought, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 2010. 
 129. See Steven M. Davidoff, Comment to SEC Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8917 & 34-57781 
(June 23, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-08/s71008-16.pdf. 
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these concepts.  Second, the scandal that drove this deregulation was the 
Enron/Worldcom debacle, the Sarbanes–Oxley response, and the 
regulatory and interest group push back.  None of these provided a 
narrative which supported heightened regulation of foreign private 
issuers despite the fact that several significant scandals at the time 
involved a foreign private issuer.  Third, the interest groups promoting 
this reform, supported by certain influential members of Congress, were 
looking for deregulatory actions.  Raising regulation of foreign private 
issuers would not appear responsive to the demands of these interest 
groups.  It was only in the context of the cross-border release, when 
these interests were absent, that the SEC could more freely act to 
increase regulation.  Finally, path dependency appears to play a 
significant role.  Having set a “one-size-fits-all” legal regime, breaking 
free of that treatment would have required a political event to justify it—
something that was lacking. 
It may be argued that the SEC simply did not agree with this thinking.  
While this argument is currently unknowable, the fact is that the path for 
foreign private issuers cleared in the past decade has been principally 
deregulatory.  The most significant actions have come in the wake of 
rhetoric and interest group politics that pushed for these measures.  It is 
doubtful that, in light of these pressures and the SEC’s reaction, the SEC 
would have implemented these measures even if they agreed with this 
Article’s conclusions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A disclaimer: This Article is not arguing in support of or against the 
SEC’s regulatory actions with respect to foreign private issuers.  Many 
of these steps are sensible and certainly supportable in a world of global 
capital and diminishing U.S. rents from New York’s capital perch.  
However, the market seems to provide some support for preservation of 
U.S. GAAP accounting.130  This latter point is an argument for a flexible 
regulatory regime with issuer choice above minimum regulatory 
levels.131  Rather, this Article argues that the SEC’s ambitious rule-
making agenda was not driven by any normative regulatory technique 
but by the political rhetoric of the time.  This rhetoric is reflected in the 
 130. See Langevoort, supra note 116, at 200–01.  Bill Bratton in this symposium outlines many of 
the problems with IFRS adoption by U.S. issuers.  William W. Bratton, Heedless Globalism: The SEC’s 
Roadmap to Accounting Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471 (2010). 
 131. For a discussion of this argument, see Davidoff, supra note 4.  For a more in-depth look at 
the issues pushing the SEC towards globalized securities regulation, see Eric C. Chaffee, The 
Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States Government’s Role in Regulating the 
Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187 (2010). 
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SEC’s rationale for its rule adoptions. 
The SEC’s failure to fully consider countervailing interests provides 
further evidence that the SEC’s regulatory revisions were driven by 
politics and rhetoric.  The interests of contrary parties such as “retail 
investors” were transformed so that the benefits—increased access—
were emphasized rather than the possible detriments —reduced 
protection and disclosure.  This was possible because these interests, 
unlike in the small issuer debate, were largely unrepresented in this rule-
making process.  The SEC’s strong actions were further justified by 
acting outside the small issuer context to support and enhance U.S. 
competitiveness in a manner responsive to public criticism.  The end 
result may have been correct, but the process did not allow for nuanced 
analysis. 
So what, one may ask?  One could argue that the rhetoric of 
competition is real, and in any event, the SEC arrived at the right result.  
This conclusion is problematic for a number of reasons.  First, the SEC 
appears to be picking and choosing interest group motivations as well as 
regulating to the strength of these interests.  Shifting rationales 
undermine the legitimacy of this regulation.  It also subjects SEC rule-
making to statutory challenge as the Administrative Procedure Act 
contains an “arbitrary and capricious” standard that the SEC risks 
violating.  Joseph Grundfest has recently highlighted the SEC’s shifting 
positions in the context of proxy access.132  Second, regulation 
promulgated in this manner defies the purpose of independent regulatory 
agencies, which is to set law in response to its mandate and the public 
interest.  While this is a particularly optimistic view of the world, the 
other regulatory techniques such as cost–benefit analysis might provide 
more uniformity and perhaps more socially optimal results.133  This 
refers to rigorous cost–benefit analysis, not the ex post facto back-of-
the-envelope calculations that the SEC appears to have employed in the 
international regulatory sphere.  Finally, the analysis in this Article is 
portable to other SEC conduct in prior years.  It could be applied to 
hedge fund regulation, Sarbanes–Oxley implementing regulation, or 
proxy-access regulation.134  If one were to watch the discourse, the same 
hortatory terms tend to repeat themselves, and the same blunt force 
 132. Joseph Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the 
Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361 (2010). 
 133. For one SEC Commissioner’s view of cost–benefit analysis, see Troy A. Paredes, Speech by 
SEC Commissioner: Remarks at “The SEC Speaks in 2009” (Feb. 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609tap.htm.  See also Edward Sherwin, The Cost–Benefit 
Analysis of Financial Regu0lation: Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2006). 
 134. Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172. 
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regulation follows. 
The results are clear even from a broad perspective.  True 
revolutionary, path-dependency breaking regulation does not come until 
there is scandal or crisis.135  The rhetoric drives the reform; rhetoric 
driven by a political economy and interest group story.136  In the mix 
SEC regulation crowds out congressional regulation; thus, more nuanced 
or rigorous regulatory techniques are lost.137  This may be inevitable, but 
it is sobering for those like Cass Sunstein, director of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes, 
who advocate more searching regulatory review.  This may occur, but it 
may also be destroyed by more traditional political narratives—even in 
the independent regulatory agency, and even in such a professional and 
accomplished place as the corporate finance division of the SEC. 
 135. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 
WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997). 
 136. For analysis in other areas, see Andrew J. Yates & Richard L. Stroup, Media Coverage and 
EPA Pesticide Decisions, 102 PUB. CHOICE 297 (2000) (finding that the EPA is responsive to news 
coverage in assessing a chemical’s use for pesticide). 
 137. Coates IV, supra note 3, at 557. 
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